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This paper derives the properties of the discount rate that should be applied to a public-sector 
project when the affected population has heterogeneous degrees of impatience.  We show that, for 
any distribution of discount rates, the social discount rate has the following properties: it decreases 
over time, it is lower than the average of the discount rates in the population and, it converges to 
the discount rate of the most patient individual in the economy. These properties hold for both 
constant and decreasing individual discount rates.  Finally, we evaluate how changes in the 
distribution of individual discount rates affect the social discount rate. 
 
Keywords: social discount rate; hyperbolic discounting; cost-benefit analysis  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1.  Introduction  
The appropriate social discount rate (SDR) to apply in public-sector cost-benefit analyses is a 
contentious issue. As Weitzman (2001 p.261) states “There does not now exist, nor has ever existed, 
anything remotely resembling a consensus, even -or, perhaps one should say especially- among the 
‘experts’ on this subject.” Especially when the discount rates of the affected population are 
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heterogeneous, social planners face the difficult problem of what weight to give to them. Of course, a 
straightforward solution would be to use a simple average of the discount rates. Although frequently 
applied in practice (Bazerlon and Smetters 1999), this method is, in general, incorrect. To see this, 
consider a project that provides a payoff of $200 in 50 years to two individuals ($100 each), Patience who 
has a discount rate of one percent and Impatience who has a discount rate of ten percent. Using the 
average of the discount rates (5.5 percent) the present value of the project would be $12.8. However, the 
present value of $100 is about $61 for Patience and $0.7 for Impatience, for a total present value of the 
project of $61.7 (which implies an SDR of about 2.4 percent). In this example, the average discount rate 
understates the present value of the project by a factor of about five.   
Further complicating the aggregation of preferences, empirical evidence has shown systematic 
departures from the standard model in which all benefits and costs are discounted at the same rate. For 
instance, people discount outcomes in the near future at a higher rate than they do for more distant 
outcomes, i.e. hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie 1992, Cropper et al 1994).  In addition, the discount rate 
may depend on the ‘sign’ (i.e. whether it is a cost or a benefit) and on the magnitude of the outcomes, 
with higher discount rates for gains (benefits) and small outcomes (Thaler 1981, Benzion et al 1989).1    
Given these and other difficulties, it is not surprising that in practice government agencies use a wide 
variety of discount rates, ranging from zero to infinite percent, with little justification (Bazerlon and 
Smetters 1999). The aim of this paper is to provide some guiding principles for the selection of the 
appropriate SDR. Specifically, we consider a social planner who gathers data on individual discount rates, 
which may be constant or decreasing with time, and uses a Benthamite social welfare function to 
aggregate them. Then, we ask: what are the properties of the SDR that she will obtain? 
This problem has been analyzed before in the literature by assuming specific distributions of the 
individual discount rates across the affected population. For example, Reinschmidt (2002) showed that if 
                                                 
1 Frederick et al. (2002) present a review of the literature on hyperbolic discounting and other ‘anomalies’ usually 
observed in experimental studies of intertemporal choice.  
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the individual discount rates are constant over time and normally distributed over the population, the SDR 
should be lower than the average of the individual rates and decreasing in time. In particular, suppose that 
a public project provides aggregate net benefits at time t of tA  and that the net benefits are divided equally 
among a population of size n. Further, suppose that individuals discount the net benefits with an 
exponential discount function, with heterogeneous discount rates iρ . Then, the present value of the 
benefits received at time t is 
1
it
t
i
A e
n
ρ−∑ . For large n we can write this as  ttA Ee ρ− , where E is the 
expectations operator over the distribution of discount rates. Assuming that the discount rates are sampled 
from a normal distribution (with a mean discount u  and a variance 2σ ), te ρ−  has a lognormal 
distribution and 
( ) 21 1
2 2
t E t Var t t
tEe e e
ρ ρ μ σρ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠= = . It follows that the SDR is 2 2soc tρ μ σ= − .   
Based on this result, Reinschmidt (2002, p.311) argues that “The aggregate social discount rate 
( ) 2 2t tρ μ σ= −   which decreases with time and variance, can be used for evaluating public-sector 
projects even when individual discount rates are considered to be constant in time.” Two linked problems 
arise from this suggestion. First, a crucial assumption of the model (that some individuals in the 
population have constant and extremely large negative discount rates) seems insufficiently plausible to 
justify placing serious reliance on the derived SDR. Second, and more important, the SDR decreases 
linearly with the project’s horizon and, as a result, is negative for sufficiently long horizons. Although 
declining discounts seem to be an empirical regularity in public-sector projects (e.g., Henderson and 
Bateman, 1995, Bazerlon and Smetters 1999), a discount rate that goes to negative infinity as the project’s 
horizon lengthens makes little sense. In order to deal with this issue Reinschmidt proposes: “To assure 
that  ( ) 0tρ ≥ , Equation (14) -the SDR- is used only in the range 20 2t μ σ≤ ≤ .” Therefore, for 
example, if 22 20μ σ = , a project that provides benefits or costs beyond twenty periods should not 
utilize this discount rate and should instead use something else. One is left to wonder what that different 
discount rate should be (e.g., what rate should be applied to discount climate change damages?).   
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 Not only is constraining the time difficult to justify on any grounds, but also, the large heterogeneity 
in discount rates usually found in the data limits the applicability of the derived SDR to analyze any kind 
of project. For instance, in the fairly homogeneous population (economics and finance students) analyzed 
by Benzion et al. (1989), across the multiple treatments 22μ σ  was never larger that twenty and usually 
much smaller. 
 Henderson and Langford (1998) and Weitzman (2001) show that a hyperbolic social discounting 
function can also be obtained by assuming a gamma distribution of the individual discount rates.2 3 Yet, 
although the gamma distribution is a more sensitive choice to model the distribution of individual rates, 
an important question remains: is hyperbolic discounting a general property of social discounting when 
the affected population has heterogeneous discount rates? The same question regards the other properties 
derived (e.g. the SDR decreases with the variance of the individual discount rates). The main contribution 
of this paper is to characterize the properties of the SDR for any distribution of discount rates. 
2.  General properties of the SDR  
Imagine a decision maker who gathers data on individual discount rates and needs to evaluate the 
present value of a project providing a stream of net benefits tA  for t=0,…,T. Consider a continuous 
population of measure one and suppose that fraction ix  of the population (group i) has a constant and 
                                                 
2 To be more precise, in Weitzman’s (2001) paper the underlying heterogeneity is among the recommendations of a 
group of experts that a government agency consults.   
3 A declining SDR might also be justified if there is uncertainty about future discount rates (e.g. Newell and Pizer 
2003) or about the state of the economy (e.g., Gollier 2002). In a quite general setting with heterogeneous individual 
discounts, Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) relate the term structure of the social discount rate with the shape of the 
individual utility functions.  
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non-negative discount rate [ ]0i min max,ρ ρ ρ∈ ≥  (alternatively, ix  can be interpreted as the proportion of 
tA  that group i receives).
4 
The present value of the stream of net benefits   
0
i
T
t
t i
t i
P A x e ρ−
=
=∑ ∑ .              (1) 
The social discount factor e-h(t) must satisfy, for every stream of net benefits ( tA )t=0,…,T and for every 
horizon T  
( )
0 0
.i
T T
th t
t t i
t t i
A e A x e ρ−−
= =
=∑ ∑ ∑             (1’) 
Since (1’) must always hold, it follows that we must also have  
( ) .ith t i
i
e x e ρ−− = ∑            (1’’) 
As in  Weitzman (1998, 2001), we define the (instantaneous) SDR as  
      '( )
i
i
t
i i
i
soc t
i
i
x e
h t
x e
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
−
−= =
∑
∑ ,              (2) 
which is a weighted mean of the individual discount rates.  
An alternative to this ‘marginal’ SDR would be to consider the ‘average’ SDR, defined 
as ( ) 1 ln ita i
i
h t t t x e ρρ −⎛ ⎞= = − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ . The relationship between the ‘marginal’ and the ‘average’ social 
discount rates is given by
0
1 ( )
t
a soct s dsρ ρ= ∫ . We choose to analyze the properties of the ‘marginal’ 
                                                 
4 The results that follow do not depend on the assumption that the individual discount rates are non-negative. Yet, as 
we show in Proposition 1, this restriction guarantees that the SDR applied to very long-term payoffs is non-negative.   
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discount rate since it is easy to verify that all the properties of socρ  presented in the paper carry over to 
aρ  (the converse is not true). 
The following proposition characterizes the properties of socρ . 
PROPOSITION 1. For any bounded distribution of the individual/group discount rates, the SDR is 
decreasing in t, it converges to minρ  as the horizon lengthens, and it is lower than the weighted average 
of the different groups’ discount rates, (i.e. 
iisoc
x∑< ρρ ).    
Although we relegate all formal proofs to a web appendix, the intuition is simple. As a payoff is delayed, 
its present value decreases more rapidly for the more impatient groups; therefore, the relative weights in 
the SDR of the more impatient people decrease with time. As a result, the social planner will use a lower 
SDR for net benefits that are further in the future and for benefits received in the very long-term she will 
only use the discount rate of the most patient group (since they are the only ones that give some value to 
the project).5 Furthermore, because the individual discount functions are convex in the discount rate, the 
appropriate SDR to use is lower than the case when the social planner simply averages the different 
groups’ discount rates.  
We also want to consider whether the properties derived above hold if, as suggested by experimental 
evidence from multiple fields, individual discount rates decline with the time horizon. Specifically, 
suppose that group i has a discount function of the form ( ) ( )ih tiD t e−= .6 It follows that the discount rate 
is ( ) ( )i it h tρ ′= , which obviously declines with time if ( )ih t′′ < 0  (i.e. ( )ih t  is concave in t). The SDR 
is, as before, a weighted average of the groups’ discount rates:  
                                                 
5 A similar result is obtained in a quite different setting in Weitzman (1998). In fact, this is also the reason why 
Reinschmidt (2002)’s social discount rate tends to negative infinity, since in the case of a normal distribution the 
most patient individual has a constant discount rate of negative infinity. 
6 The exponential form is assumed here for ease of comparison with the case of constant discount rates; the only 
requirement to obtain the results, however, is that the discount function is convex in time.  
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( ) ( )
( )
i
i
h t
i i
i
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i
i
x h t e
x e
ρ
−
−
′
=
∑
∑ ;              (3) 
in fact, the SDR with constant discount rates is just a special case in which ( )i ih t tρ=  and i ih ρ′ = .  
 What are the properties of the SDR when the individual discount rates decline with the project’s 
horizon? As one would expect, in addition to aggregation issues that make social discounting hyperbolic 
even when individual discount rates are constant, the fact that individuals become ‘more patient’ over 
time gives an additional reason for the SDR to decline over time. Also, as long as the discount function is 
convex, the appropriate discount factor for a given horizon will be higher than that applied by a social 
planner who uses the average of the groups’ discount rates in the same discount function. Finally, the 
SDR converges to the lower bound of the support of the discount rates’ distribution that holds in the limit. 
The intuition of this last result is as follows. When discount rates are constant, the weight that a given 
group receives in the SDR increases monotonically relative to the weights of the more impatient groups. 
Instead, when discount rates vary over time, patience is defined relative to the payoff’s horizon; therefore, 
the relative weights may be non-monotonic. For instance, suppose that group ‘A’ discounts the near 
future more heavily than group ‘B’, but the discount rate of the former declines to a lower limiting level. 
Then, group A’s relative weight will decline initially and, as they become more patient, it will eventually 
start to increase. In fact, the weight attached to the group with the lowest discount rate will converge to 
one. 
In addition to establishing the properties of the SDR for a given population, we can evaluate how 
changes in the distribution of discount rates affect the SDR. Specifically, we want to determine conditions 
under which the SDR will unambiguously increase or decrease given a shift in the distribution of 
individual discount rates.  
We begin by noting that, although first and second order stochastically dominated shifts in the 
distribution of discount rates increase the present value of the project, they are neither necessary nor 
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sufficient to decrease the SDR for all horizons. Therefore, we need stronger notions of stochastic 
dominance. 
DEFINITION 1. Monotone likelihood ratio dominance (MLR). Let Y and Z denote two random 
variables with respective distribution functions FY and FZ. We say that Z dominates Y  in the sense of 
MLR ( MLRZ YV ) if there exist numbers -∞≤a≤b≤∞ and a non-decreasing function h:[a,b]→[0, ∞] such 
that Pr(Z<a)=0, Pr(Y>b)=0 and dFZ (x)=h(x) dFY (x) on [a,b]. 
 In other words, a MLR dominated shift for a given distribution puts less weight for higher values of 
ρ . When Y and Z have a finite common support 1 ...... nρ ρ< <  with respective weights ( ) 1,.....,Yi i nx =  and   
( )
1,.....,
Z
i i n
x =  then Z dominates Y in the sense of MLR if and only if 
1
1
.....
ZZ
n
Y Y
n
xx
x x
≤ ≤ . This concept is widely 
used in the statistical literature and was first introduced in the context of portfolio problems by 
Landsberger and Meilijson7  (1990). MLR dominance is stronger than FSD and, in particular, a MLR 
dominated shift for a given distribution reduces the mean.  
DEFINITION 2. Portfolio Dominance (PD). Let Y and Z denote two random variables. We say that Z 
dominates Y in the sense of PD ( PDZ YV )  if we have ( ) ( )' ( ) 0 ' ( ) 0E u Z Z a E u Y Y a⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− = ⇒ − ≤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  for any 
real number a and any non-decreasing and concave function u . 
This concept has been introduced in the context of portfolio problems by Landsberger and Meilijson 
(1993) and further studied by Gollier (1997). It characterizes the changes in the distribution of the returns 
of the risky asset that lead to an increase in demand for the risky asset irrespective of the risk-free rate. In 
the portfolio context, it is then related to the degree of riskiness of the assets returns. In our context, it is 
related to individual discount rates’ heterogeneity. In particular a mean preserving PD dominated shift for 
a given distribution increases the variance (Jouini and Napp, 2008).  
                                                 
7 More precisely, Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) showed that in the standard portfolio problem a MLR shift in 
the distribution of returns of the risky asset leads to an increase in demand for the risky asset for all agents with 
nondecreasing utilities. 
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This leads to  
PROPOSITION 2. MLR and PD stochastically dominated shifts in the distribution of the individual 
discount rates reduce the SDR. 
Therefore, although there is no necessary connection between the mean and the variance of the discount 
rates and the SDR (as in Reinschmidt 2002 or Weitzman 2001), there is a well defined sense in which 
projects in more patient and heterogeneous societies (in the sense of MLR and mean preserving PD shifts) 
should use smaller discounts.8  So, for instance, since discount rates are generally negatively correlated 
with wealth (e.g., Hausman 1979, Lawrance 1991) we should expect that, everything else constant, in 
countries with larger wealth inequality the discount rates applied to social projects will be lower. Of 
course, countries with high wealth inequality but also low wealth levels may still apply a relatively high 
SDR. 
3. Example 
 To provide a simple example of what our results mean in practice, we calculate the SDR (Equation 2) 
using the frequency distribution of discount rates obtained by Weitzman (2001) in a survey of 
economists.9 Figure 1 illustrates the implied SDR for different horizons. Clearly, heterogeneity among the 
respondents in the survey makes the SDR decline substantially, from about 4 percent -the weighted mean 
in the sample- to 0 percent -the lowest discount rate-, and quite rapidly over the time horizon.  
                                                 
8 For example, suppose that in one population (say “A”) we have three equally large groups with discount rates 2%, 
4% and 6%. In a second population (“B”), there are three groups with the same discount rates but with proportions 
in the population equal to 0.1, 0.8 and 0.1 respectively.  It follows that both populations have the same weighted 
average of discount rates (4%). However, because the distribution of discount rates in A is dominated in the sense of  
PD by the distribution of discount rates in B, the discount rate for the former is lower for all t. 
9 The survey asked for the appropriate rate to discount long-term benefits and costs and not necessarily the 
respondents’ rate of time preference. Our SDR was calculated ‘as if’ the response represented the individual’s 
constant rate of time preference. See web appendix for further details. 
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 The SDR obtained is, for most time horizons, lower than the sequence of declining rates suggested  
by Moore et al. (2004). Of course, a different population may lead to different results. For instance, 
Proposition 2 states that in a more homogeneous population the appropriate SDR would be higher. Yet, 
we suspect that, for the United States as a whole, heterogeneity of discount rates is larger than in the 
sample of economists, which implies even lower not higher discount rates. Therefore, although our 
framework is not inconsistent with Moore et al. (2004), it does not provide strong support for the rates 
recommended. 
 
           
4. Conclusions 
This paper provided a general characterization of the properties of the social discount rate when the 
discount rates of the affected population are heterogeneous and when using a Benthamite social welfare 
function. Importantly, we showed that the social discounting function should be hyperbolic when 
individual discount rates are declining or even constant. This is of great practical relevance since it 
implies that, for projects providing net benefits at different periods, decision-makers do not need to 
estimate the individual discount rates across time (a task that is likely to be very demanding) to justify 
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Figure 1. SDR for Different Horizons  
Note. We employed the frequency distribution of discount rates obtained by Weitzman 
(2001) [Table 1, p. 268] to calculate the proportion xi of the sample with a given discount 
rate ρi in Equation (2). See web appendix for further details.  
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applying declining discounts. For instance, Henderson and Langford (1998 p.1498-1499)  state that “In 
practical terms the weight of evidence in favor of hyperbolic discounting must be particularly convincing 
if there is to be any likelihood of introducing its use in analyses by government agencies.” Given the 
generality of our results, we believe that this paper provides such evidence. 
 Our results are particularly relevant for very long-term cost-benefit evaluations (e.g. those dealing 
with global climate change) that are especially sensitive to the selected discount rate. 10 We showed that, 
for those cases, the appropriate SDR should be equal to the discount rate of the most patient individuals 
which, in practice, is likely to be close to zero percent. 
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Proofs of Statements and Data for Numerical Example 
 
EC.1.     PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.  
PROPOSITION 1. For any bounded distribution of the individual/group discount rates, the SDR is 
decreasing in t, it converges to minρ  as the horizon lengthens, and it is lower than the weighted average 
of the different groups’ discount rates, (i.e. 
iisoc
x∑< ρρ ).   
EC.1.1.    Proof that 0soc tρ∂ ∂ <  
Denote iti ix e
ρθ −= . Taking the derivative of the SDR with respect to the project’s horizon gives    
2
22 2
2
*i i i i i i i i i
i i i isoc i
i
i ii
ii
t
ρ θ θ ρθ ρ θ ρθρ
θθθ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− + ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥= = − − ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥∂ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑∑∑
.  
From Jensen’s inequality we know that the second term in brackets must be equal or lower than the first 
term, proving the result that the sign of the derivative is non-positive (and negative when there is 
heterogeneity).  
EC.1.2.     Proof that minlim soct ρ ρ→∞ = .  
Denote the (arbitrary) difference between the discount rate of the most patient group (with subscript 
min ) and any other group as iy  (i.e., min i iyρ ρ= − ). Then, the SDR can be written as 
( )minmin
min
min min
min
min
min
min min
min
 
                           ,
ii
i
i
i
y ttt
i ii i
ii
soc t
y tti
ii
i
y t
i i
i
x e x ex e
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z x x e
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ρ ρ
− +−−
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−
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≠
−
≠
⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= = ⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑∑
∑ ∑
∑
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where 
1
min
min
iy t
i
i
z x x e
−
−
≠
⎛ ⎞≡ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ . Taking the limit as the project’s horizon goes to infinity yields, 
1
minlimt z x
−
→∞ =  and minlim 0
iy t
i it i
x eρ −→∞ ≠ =∑ , which provides the result that  minlim soct ρ ρ→∞ = . 
EC.1.3.    Proof that i i it x ti
i i
x e eρ ρ− −≥∑ ∑  
Again invoking Jensen’s inequality, since ite ρ−  is convex in iρ  we obtain that  i i it x ti
i i
x e eρ ρ− −≥∑ ∑ , 
i.e., the appropriate discount factor (rate) is higher (lower) than the case when the social planner simply 
averages the groups discount rates.  
EC.2.     PROOF OF RESULTS FOR THE DISCOUNT FUNCTION ( ) ( )ih tiD t e−=  
 In the text we mentioned that the SDR for the discount function ( ) ( )ih tiD t e−=  has three properties: it 
decreases with time, it converges to the lower bound of the support of the distribution of discount rates 
that holds in the limit, and it is lower than the average discount rate.  
EC.2.1.    Proof that 0soc tρ∂ ∂ <  
The derivative of the SDR with respect to the project’s horizon is 
( )i i i i i i
soc i i i
i i i
i i i
h h h
t
22θ θ θρ
θ θ θ
⎛ ⎞′ ′′ ′− ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ , 
where ihi ix eθ −=  and all the terms may be functions of time. 
The first and third terms are isomorphic to the terms obtained in the case of constant discount rates. As 
before, by Jensen’s inequality the sum of these terms is non-positive. The second term is new and results 
from the fact that the groups’ discount rates change over time. Given our assumption that the discount 
rates decrease over time (i.e. ( )ih t′′ < 0 ) it must be the case that 0soc tρ∂ ∂ < .  
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EC.2.2.     Proof that ( )minlim soct hρ→∞ ′= ∞ . 
Remember that the SDR is a weighted average of the different groups’ discount rates. Denote the weight 
of the group with ( )minh′ ∞ as  
( )
( )
min
min
min i
h t
h t
i
i
x ez
x e
−
−= ∑  ,  
where we used the subscript min  in the fraction x  and the function ( )h t  to refer to this group (i.e. it 
does not mean, for instance, that minx is the lowest ix ). Note that  
( )
( )
( ) ( )( )min minmin min min i
j
h t
h t h t
h t
i ii
z x e x e
z xx e
−
− −
−= = .  
Differentiating this ratio with respect to time we obtain 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )minmin min min ih t h ti i
i
z z x h t h t e
t x
− −∂ ′ ′= − −∂ .  
This says that, if discount rates are constant, the weights of the more patient groups relative to the more 
impatient groups would increase monotonically over time. Therefore, minlim  minit z z i→∞ = ∞ ∀ ≠ , i.e., the 
most patient group would receive a weight of 1 (which provides an alternative proof to the second part of 
Proposition 1). When discount rates are not constant the ratio of the weights may be non-monotonic; yet, 
because by definition it will eventually be true that ( ) ( )min ih t h t′ ′< , minz  will approach 1 as in the case 
with constant discount rates. 
EC.2.3.    Proof that the SDR is lower that the weighted mean of discount rates  
As long as the discount function is convex, by Jensen’s inequality the appropriate discount factor will be 
higher than that applied by a social planner that uses the average of the groups’ discount rates in the same 
discount function, i.e., ( )( ) ( ), ,i i i i i i
i i
x D t t D t x tρ ρ⎛ ⎞≥ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ .  
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EC.3.     PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 
PROPOSITION 2. MLR and PD stochastically dominated shifts in the distribution of the individual 
discount rates reduce the SDR. 
Let us consider Y and Z two random variables with associated distribution functions FY and FZ such 
that Z≽MLRY. Without loss of generality, we may assume that Y and Z have the same support. By 
definition, the social discount rates Zsocρ   and Ysocρ  respectively associated to Z and Y are given by  
Zt
Z
soc Zt
E Ze
E e
ρ
−
−
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 and 
Yt
Y
soc Yt
E Ye
E e
ρ
−
−
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
. We have then 
[ ]
[ ]
exp
exp
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
t t
Z YZ
soc t t
Z Y
e dF e h dF E Yh Y
E h Ye dF e h dF
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ ρ
− −
− −= = =∫ ∫∫ ∫  where h is non-decreasing and where E
exp 
is the expectation operator associated to the probability whose density with respect to the initial 
probability is equal to 
Yt
Yt
e
E e
−
−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
. Since h is non-decreasing, we have 
1 2 1 2 1 2( )( ( ) ( )) ( , ) 0y y h y h y d d y yν ν− − ⊗ ≥∫∫  with respect to any probability measure ν  on the real 
line. We have then ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )yh y d y yd y h y d yν ν ν≥∫ ∫ ∫  and in particular 
[ ] [ ] [ ]exp exp exp( ) ( )E Yh Y E Y E h Y≥  which leads to Z Ysoc socρ ρ≥ . 
Let us assume now that Z≽PDY. We have 
Zt
Z
soc Zt
E Ze
E e
ρ
−
−
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 and then '( )( ) 0ZsocE u Z Z ρ⎡ ⎤− =⎣ ⎦  with 
( ) xtu x e−= − . By definition, this implies that '( )( ) 0ZsocE u Y Y ρ⎡ ⎤− ≤⎣ ⎦ hence Z Ysoc socρ ρ≥ . 
EC.4.     DATA FOR NUMERICAL EXAMPLE   
To calculate the SDR in Figure 1 we used equation (2) in the text, soc i i i i
i i
xρ ρθ θ=∑ ∑ , together with 
the data collected by Weitzman (2001) in a survey of economists. In particular, he asked the question:   
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“Taking all relevant considerations into account, what real interest rate do you think 
should be used to discount over time the (expected) benefits and (expected) costs of 
projects being proposed to mitigate the possible effects of global climate change?” 
The frequency distribution is reproduced in the following table.  
 
 
Discount rate (%) Frequency* ix  
0 46 0.0213
1 236 0.1094
2 454 0.2105
3 427 0.1980
4 362 0.1678
5 227 0.1052
6 136 0.0631
7 71 0.0329
8 44 0.0204
9 28 0.0130
10 44 0.0204
11 15 0.0070
12 25 0.0116
13 12 0.0056
14 5 0.0023
15 8 0.0037
16 3 0.0014
17 2 0.0009
18 3 0.0014
19 1 0.0005
20 4 0.0019
25 2 0.0009
26 1 0.0005
27 1 0.0005
Total responses 2157  
*Source: Table 1 p.268 Weitzman (2001). Responses (3) with a negative discount rate were excluded. 
  
 
